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OBSERVATION
WHY THE 1985 NORTH CAROLINA OBSCENITY
LAW IS FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG
ARNOLD H. LOEWYt
North Carolina's 1985 obscenity law1 goes to (if not beyond) the constitu-
tional limit in prohibiting the dissemination of sexually explicit books and mov-
ies. 2 The legislators' overriding philosophy towards sexually explicit material
seems to be: "Forbid it if we can. Resolve all doubts in favor of suppression."
Obviously, this is contrary to our approach towards other offensive literature.
We do not (indeed cannot) suppress such repulsive books and movies as Com-
munist 3 or Nazi4 propaganda or violent fiction.
5
Because our libertarian traditions compel acceptance of these other offen-
sive materials, it is necessary to ask, "What is there about obscenity that war-
rants a different attitude?" Several things immediately come to mind.
Pornographers have been known to force both adults and children to degrade
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, at Chapel Hill. B.S. 1961, J.D. 1963,
Boston University; LL.M. 1964, Harvard University.
1. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-190.1 to -190.29 (1986)). The new law became effective October 1, 1985, and it is divided into
two parts. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-190.1 to -190.9 (1986), constitute the obscenity section, and N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-190.13 to -190.20 (1986), constitute the protection of minors section. See Watts,
Obscenity and Related Offenses, 1985 NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 171 (1985).
2. Arguable excesses of the amended statute include the prohibitions on showing obscenity
with friends in the privacy of one's home, see Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 1(1), 1985 N.C. Sess.
Laws 929, 929 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (1986)) (deletion by the 1985 amendment of
the words "in any public place" thereby prohibits dissemination of obscene material even in private
places), and the statutory inference that a person simulating a minor is a minor. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-190.16, 14-190.17 (1986). The United States Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 763 (1982), explicitly approved adult simulation of minors engaged in sexual activity. The
North Carolina statutory inference of minority arguably interferes with this right of simulation pro-
vided in Ferber. See Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, No. 8610SC269, slip op. at 22 (N.C. Ct.
App. filed Dec. 30, 1986) (Becton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even though it is
stated as an inference rather than a presumption, the provision will not survive constitutional attack
if the courts apply it liberally and relieve the State from the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person who appeared to be a minor in fact was a minor. Watts, supra note 1, at 187;
see also Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of North Carolina's New Obscenity Law, 65 N.C.L. REV.
400 (1987) (discussing the recent amendments to North Carolina's obscenity statute and possible
constitutional challenges).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, in a two to one decision, upheld the constitu-
tionality of the 1985 amendments to the obscenity law. Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, No.
8610SC269 (N.C. Ct. App. filed Dec. 30, 1986). The North Carolina Supreme Court undoubtedly
will review this case pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1986), which provides an automatic
right of appeal to the supreme court in any case in which there is a dissent.
3. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
4. See National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
5. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1947).
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themselves on film to make a fast buck for the pornographer. 6 Sex shops with-
out limit can overstimulate our children, degrade our neighborhoods, and invade
our privacy as we walk through the shopping areas of our cities.
7
Slavery or involuntary servitude (sexual or otherwise) is, of course, an un-
speakable outrage, rightly condemned not only by all of the states, but by the
United States Constitution itself.8 Exploitation of children in all forms has been
universally and rightly condemned-although there are some definitional
problems, such as whether some of the movies starring actress Brooke Shields
constitute child exploitation. Although not as essential as laws prohibiting ex-
ploitation, laws that require discreet display of sexually explicit material, 9 zone
stores selling sexually explicit material,10 and prohibit sex supermarkets (stores
selling sexually explicit books and showing sexually explicit movies under the
same roof)11 help preserve our neighborhoods and protect our privacy.
The North Carolina law, however, does not end with these concerns. A
clerk at a video store who responds to a customer's request for a particular sexu-
ally explicit video tape can spend several years in prison, if a jury subsequently
finds that tape to have been obscene. It is no defense that the customer re-
quested the tape, that the tape was kept out of sight until requested by the cus-
tomer, or that all of the performers on the tape were willing adults. The same
fate can befall a clerk who upon request sells a sexually explicit book containing
nothing but printed words. The absence of photographs does not preclude a
6. I U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A'TTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY: FI-
NAL REPORT 610-19 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The Commission reported that
"[w]itnesses [have] attributed to pornography their having been coerced into pornographic perform-
ances," id. at 768, and that "other witnesses before Congress described the kidnapping of small
children by pornographers and even their sale by parents." Id. at 601.
7. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), in which the Supreme Court stated:
there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscen-
ity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles
and to passersby. Rights and interests "other than those of the advocates are involved."
These include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community
environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public
safety itself.
Id. at 57-58 (quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951))(citation ommitted).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime.., shall exist within the Unites States .... "
9. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.14 (1986) (prohibiting the open display of material that is
"harmful to minors"). But see American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 792 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir.)
(invalidating amendment to Virginia obscenity statute making it unlawful to knowingly display sex-
ual explicit materials "in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and peruse" them), modified, 802
F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3557 (1987).
10. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (upholding two Detroit
ordinances that required geographic dispersal of specified "adult establishments" for the purpose of
"preserving the character of [the city's] neighborhoods"); see also City of Reuton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986) (upholding zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters from
locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church, park, or
school).
11. See Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979) (upholding a North
Carolina statute providing that a single building containing any adult bookstore, theater, mini-thea-
ter, or massage parlor cannot contain a second such establishment), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929
(1980).
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finding of obscenity.1 2
Why should we punish these clerks? Surely not to protect our children,
preserve our neighborhoods, or ensure our privacy. The clerks have invaded
none of these interests. Rather, they have merely transmitted thoughts that
many deem to be abhorrent. There is some division among proponents of strict
anti-obscenity legislation concerning what is most abhorrent about obscenity.
Some oppose the idea of licentious free sex;13 others are especially offended by
the degrading portrayal of women.1 4 Whichever one views as the principal evil,
it seems fair to say that some forms of obscenity convey both ideas. The ques-
tion is: Can ideas and thoughts ever be so evil that the government is justified in
punishing those who transmit them?
Punishment for thought transmission has been an anathema in this coun-
try.1 5 Although degradation of women is extremely repulsive, it is no worse
than degradation of Blacks, Jews, men, or any other group. Yet the polestar of
our constitutional philosophy, unlike that of the Soviet Union or other restric-
tive governments, has always been that it is better to let these hated ideas go
unpunished than to trust government or juries to decide which thoughts can be
freely expressed and which ones need to be punished. 16 Obscenity should be
treated no differently.
Fundamentally, the Supreme Court does not disagree. When a state pur-
ported to ban a movie because it portrayed adultery as desirable behavior, the
Court unanimously invalidated the statute. 17 In Roth v. United States,"8 the
12. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (1986). "It shall be unlawful ... to sell, deliver or provide
any obscene writing .... Id.
13. I FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 335-47. Some of the members of the Commission "be-
lieve that uncommitted sexual activity is wrong for the individuals and harmful to society" and
therefore oppose the display of licentious free sex. Id. at 339. According to these persons, "there are
acts that need be seen not only as causes of immorality but as manifestations of it." Id. at 303.
14. See MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1
(1985). According to MacKinnon, "Pornography constructs what a woman is in terms of its view of
what men want sexually, such that acts of rape, battery [and) sexual harrasment ... become acts of
sexual equality." Id. at 17. For a general discussion of pornography and its degrading impact on
women, see A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981). Both Catherine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin testified before the Attorney General's Commission on Pornogra-
phy. Together they have drafted legislation that treats pornography as a violation of women's civil
rights. See I FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 391-96.
15. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg the Supreme Court held
that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at
447; cf. Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and
Beyond, 1969 Sup. Cr. REV. 41 (1969) (analyzing and distinguishing the "clear and present danger"
test and the Brandenburg decision).
16. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette the
Supreme Court stated that "[if there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion." Id. at 642.
17. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684
(1959). The State of New York was attempting to ban the exhibition of a movie because that movie
advocated the idea that adultery can be proper behavior. Noting that the first amendment guaran-
tees the freedom to advocate ideas, the Court stated that "[tihe State, quite simply, has thus struck at
the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty." Id. at 688. Cf American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the state statute's definition of "pornography" as
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seminal case allowing states to prohibit obscenity, the Court concluded:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-un-
orthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more im-
portant interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment
is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance. 19
The Roth Court, relying on an earlier decision, noted also:
"It has been well observed that such [lewd and obscene] utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality
"20
The irony is unmistakable. The Supreme Court allows the suppression of ob-
scenity only because it believes obscenity to be devoid of ideology. The North
Carolina General Assembly chooses to punish store clerks who sell obscenity to
prevent the spread of these supposedly nonexistent ideas.
Some proponents of the North Carolina law view it as one designed to con-
trol conduct rather than thoughts and ideas. They contend that consumers of
obscenity are more apt to commit violent crimes, especially against women, than
those who read or watch more conventional fare.21 The difficulty with this argu-
ment is that unless it can distinguish obscenity from other repulsive thoughts, it
proves too much. For example, common sense suggests that people who read
American Nazi literature are more prone to violence against minorities than
those with more conventional reading tastes. Nevertheless, our Constitution
does not permit purveyors of such literature to be convicted. 22 Yet violent and
hate-filled literature has probably done more harm than has obscenity.
23
"the sexually explicit subordination of women graphically depicted whether in pictures or words"
was unconstitutional), aft'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
18. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
19. Id. at 484.
20. Id. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (emphasis
deleted).
21. See generally I FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 938-76. (discussing the relationship between
pornography and deviant behavior). The Commission concluded that the contribution of pornogra-
phy to sexual deviancy is an open question and that although there is evidence indicating a possible
correlation between the availability of pornography and the incidence of rape in the United States,
the evidence is far from clear. Id. at 974-75.
22. See National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
23. See I FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 977-1007. For instance, one study showed that males
who were exposed to a large number of films depicting violent acts against women came to feel less
sympathetic toward the women, tended to underestimate the males' violence, and began to evaluate
such acts as significantly less degrading to the women. Subjects shown X-rated films, however,
experienced no such change in objectification of women, acceptance of conservative sex roles, or rape
myth acceptance. Id. (citing D. Linz, Sexual Violence in the Mass Media: Effects on Male Viewers
and Implications for Society (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin (1985))).
See generally Donnerstein, Aggressive Pornography: Can it Influence Aggression Against Women?, in
PROMOTING SEXUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PREVENTING SEXUAL PROBLEMS (G. Albee, S.
Gordon & H. Leitenberg eds. 1983) (arguing that a direct causal relationship exists between the
viewing of aggressive erotica and violence toward women).
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Even if punishment for thought transmission were acceptable, it is doubtful
that eliminating obscenity, or even all sexually provocative material, would do
much good. Psychologically unbalanced criminals are so idiosyncratic that it is
difficult to know what might set them off. For example, one psychopath was
inspired to castrate and "sacrifice" young boys by reading about sacrifices in the
Bible.24 Because it is so difficult to know what effect any literature will have on
a given person, the value of suppression is necessarily speculative.
Punishment for thought transmission is not the only price we pay for this
highly speculative benefit. Whenever we prosecute a clerk who sells a videotape
or book, policemen, prosecutors, jurors, judges, and defense attorneys have to
spend countless hours investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating, and defending
the case. Ordinary citizens sitting on the jury,2 5 who may find this material
revolting, are required to examine it carefully so that they can determine
whether it appeals predominantly to the prurient interest--" 'a shameful or
morbid interest in... sex' "2 6 -based on contemporary community standards,
whether it describes sexual activity in a patently offensive manner, and whether
it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. If the jury finds all
of these things beyond a reasonable doubt, the material is obscene; otherwise, it
is not.27 With such vague standards, it is not surprising that juries have reached
disparate results when dealing with substantially similar material. 28
24. See Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 655, 668 (1964). Other exam-
ples include: Heinrich Pommerenke, who was prompted by Cecil B. DeMille's film The Ten Com-
mandments to rape, abuse, and slay women; and John George Haigh, who was inspired by the
procedures of the Anglican High Church Service to drink his victims' blood through straws and
dissolve their bodies in acid baths. Id. at 668.
25. In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), witnesses who testified that they were familiar
with the contemporary standard of their communities included the following: a pastor who was also
chairman of the State Literature Commission; a service station attendant; an attorney; a retired
locomotive engineer; an optometrist; a real estate salesman; an assistant solicitor general; and an
investigator. Brief for Appellee at 8-9, Stanley.
26. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tentative Draft No.
6 (1957)).
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(b) (1986). The North Carolina Obscenity Law provides:
For purposes of this article any material is obscene if-
(1) The material depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by subsection (c) of this section; and
(2) The average person applying contemporary community standards relating to the de-
piction or description of sexual matters would find that the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and
(3) The material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value; and
(4) The material as used is not protected or privileged under the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of North Carolina.
Id.
The North Carolina rule is based on the three-part test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1983), for identifying obscene material. The three questions in the Miller test are:
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.
Id. at 24.
28. See Curtis, Obscenity: The Justices' (Not So) New Robes, 8 CAMPBELL L. REv. 387, 409-
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This raises a final concern about the North Carolina statute: its vagueness.
People are going to prison for violating standards that neither they nor anyone
else can understand. Because of this uncertainty, a prudent merchant would
refrain from selling anything that approaches the line. Consequently, our citi-
zens may be denied access not only to obscene material, but also to non-obscene
material (such as marriage manuals that counselors sometimes recommend to
help save a failing marriage) that a merchant will not sell for fear that a jury
might find it obscene.
North Carolina's former statute dealt with this problem by providing for a
hearing to determine the obscenity of a book or movie before prosecution.29 If
the book or movie were found obscene, the merchant could then remove it with-
out fear of imprisonment. This hearing procedure was removed because of a
legislative determination that obscenity convictions are more important than
giving merchants specific notice about the obscenity of their materials.
The ultimate solution to the obscenity problem is to retain, and when neces-
sary enhance, constitutional legislation designed to protect our children, neigh-
borhoods, and privacy. If more is needed, private citizens can engage in the
constitutionally protected and thoroughly American practice of picketing or
boycotting stores that sell material they do not like. Although the President's
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography questioned the efficacy of this prac-
tice,30 the practice has recently convinced one chain of stores to stop selling
sexually explicit magazines.
31
Whatever else the State does, however, it ought to give up the thoroughly
un-American practice of punishing people who transmit evil thoughts.
412 (1986). Commenting on the "community standard" test, one juror candidly assessed the prob-
lem: "We all come from different communities and we all feel very differently." Id. at 409.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (Supp. 1979) (repealed by Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 2,
1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 930).
30. 1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 419-29. Nevertheless, the Commission noted that "the
fears that many arguably valuable but sexually frank works of fiction and non-fiction will be stifled
not by governmental action but by social pressure is real." Id. at 425.
31. The Southland Corporation, partially in response to the findings of the Pornography Com-
mission, decided to stop selling adult magazines at its 4500 7-Eleven stores. Southland 7-Eleven
Stores Drop Playboy, Penthouse, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1986, at 13, col. 3.
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